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Robert F. Blomquist* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Overinterpretation has attracted considerable attention in other 
fields, such as literary studies, science, and rhetoric, but it is under-
theorized in law.  This Article attempts to initiate a theory of legal 
overinterpretation by examining the rhetorical nature of excess, the 
sociological dimensions of roles in team performances, and citation to 
legal and non-legal sources that have discussed overinterpretation.  The 
Article concludes by positing illustrative categories of potential legal 
overinterpretation, and providing an examination of ways to minimize 
legal overinterpretation through a judicious, pragmatic balance between 
abstract considerations and concrete considerations in law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Think of the dense and uncabined legal doctrines and accompanying 
jurisprudence of implied federal preemption of conflicting state law in 
constitutional law and of negligence per se in tort law.  Both depend 
upon legal overinterpretation.  Overinterpretation is as unappealing and 
counter-productive in the law as it is in other fields of human endeavor 
like literature, film, art, science, politics, and medicine.  Consider some 
examples by way of introduction to the fascinating subject of cultural 
overinterpretation. 
In the second chapter of Booker Prize-winning author Ian 
McEwan’s exquisite novel, Atonement, two key characters, Cecilia and 
Robbie—both Cambridge students on summer break in 1935—have a 
sexually-charged conversation in front of a stately manor house on a hot 
afternoon.  As Cecilia rolls a cigarette for Robbie they engage in 
intellectual banter about eighteenth century English literature layered 
with chitchat about Robbie’s future plans to become a doctor and to 
continue the “student life.”  The limited omniscient narrator follows up 
Cecilia’s line, “That’s my point.  Another six years [of university].  Why 
do it?” with the following observation:  “He wasn’t offended.  She was 
the one who was overinterpreting, and jittery in his presence, and she 
was annoyed with herself.”1  What does the author mean? 
 
 1. IAN MCEWAN, ATONEMENT 25 (2001) (emphasis added). 
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In an essay entitled Down the Yellow Brick Road of 
Overinterpretation,
2
 a critic discusses the then upcoming fiftieth 
anniversary, in 2006, of the first television appearance in 1956 of the 
1939 movie, The Wizard of Oz,
3
 and the sesquicentennial of Frank 
Baum’s birth (the author of the book that ultimately led to the movie).  
As the critic explains: 
Oz went on to become one of the great place names in the fantasy 
culture of childhood, the predecessor and equal of Never-Never 
Land, Narnia and Hogwarts.  The book proved to be as fertile to the 
popular imagination as the Kansas soil is to wheat.  Out of that 
original . . . manuscript [came] no less than 13 sequels, enough films 
to keep a movie megaplex busy, and Broadway blockbusters such as 
“The Wiz” and “Wicked.”
4
 
Our Wizard of Oz critic goes on to point out that “there is a long 
history of digging deeper into Baum’s books and searching for hidden 
meanings.”5  In this regard, we learn that one of the most famous hidden 
meanings of the book was that it was “a parable of the Populist 
movement of the 1890s” with Dorothy a symbol of the American people, 
the Scarecrow an icon of farmers, the Tin Man representing factory 
laborers, and the Cowardly Lion standing for the three-time presidential 
candidate for the Democrats, William Jennings Bryan.
6
  In 1964, a high-
school history teacher named Henry M. Littlefield published the 
aforementioned symbolic take on Frank Baum’s Wizard of Oz story with 
the following meta-interpretation:  “One of the leading concerns of 
Bryan and the Populists was to get off the gold standard (the Yellow 
Brick Road) and replace it with the silver standard (the color of 
Dorothy’s slippers in the book [but not the ruby slippers in the movie]).”7  
Amazingly, after Littlefield’s interpretational tome, “reading the Oz 
books became a kind of parlor game”:  Oz enthusiasts tackled “the 
challenge of trying to figure out exactly what Baum meant to imply when 
he wrote about Toto the dog (teetotalism?) and the Winged Monkeys 
(Plain Indians?).”  One analyst went so far as to argue that “‘Oz’ is more 
than a nonsense word borrowed from a filing drawer—it’s a cunning 
reference to the abbreviation for ‘ounce,’ a common unit of measurement 
for both gold and silver.”8  Our critic contends that the “real brilliance” 
 
 2. John J. Miller, Down the Yellow Brick Road of Overinterpretation, WALL ST. J., 
May 11, 2006, at D6. 
 3. THE WIZARD OF OZ (MGM 1939). 
 4. Miller, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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of Baum’s Wizard of Oz story was its entertainment value and that 
readers were well-advised to take the tale “at face value” instead of 
“pushing the parable too hard” and “overlook[ing]” certain facts or 
inferences in favor of others.
9
 
As a third introductory reference, consider the following line from a 
book by an intellectual historian discussing the meaning of the 
widespread depiction of the voluptuous female figure in Paleolithic art: 
“Whether some of these early ‘sexual images’ have been over-
interpreted, it nonetheless remains true that sex is one of the main 
images in early art, and that depiction of female sex organs is far more 
widespread than the depiction of male organs.”10 
What all the previous three references to overinterpretation share, 
of course, is the root “over”—depending on its usage being either an 
adverb, a preposition, a noun, or an adjective.  “Over” is an adverb 
“expressing movement or position or state above or beyond something 
stated or implied.”  Indeed, overinterpretation is akin to similar words in 
suggesting some form of excess:  “overabundant,” “overachieve,” 
“overactive,” “overambitious,” “overanxious,” “overawe,” 
“overbearing,” “overblown,” “overbuild,” “overbusy,” “overcapacity,” 
“overcareful,” “overcharge,” “overcompensate,” “overconfident,” 
“overcook,” “overcritical,” “overcrop,” “overcrowd,” “overcurious,” 
“overdevelop,” “overdo,” “overdose,” “overdraft,” “overdrink,” 
“overeager,” “overeat,” “overelaborate,” “overemotional,” 
“overemphasis,” “overenthusiasm,” “overexercise,” “overexpose,” 
“overextend,” “overgeneralize,” “overheat,” “overmeasure,” 
“overpopulated,” “overreact,” “overrun,” “overspend,” “oversteer,” and 
“overtax”—to name a sampling of such words.11  Excess, moreover, is a 
quality that arguably defines twenty-first century American culture.
12
 
This Article builds on America’s fascination with excess while 
focusing on the specific problem of overinterpreting law.  In Part II, my 
Article explores the analogous nature of excess in the field of rhetoric.  
Part III, in turn, considers the sociological dimensions of excess as a 
problem of roles in a team performance.  Part IV examines appellate 
judicial opinions and law review writings that have utilized the lexemes 
overinterpretation, overinterpret, or similar language.  Finally, in Part V, 
before concluding, I first explore some illustrative categories of potential 
legal overinterpretation.  Then, I attempt to unpack, better understand, 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. PETER WATSON, IDEAS: A HISTORY OF THOUGHT AND INVENTION, FROM FIRE TO 
FREUD 36 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 11. OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 1062-67 (American ed., 1996). 
 12. See, e.g., WALTER KIRN, MISSION TO AMERICA (2005).  The book jacket claims 
that this novel is about “an overstimulated, overfed, spiritually overextended America.” 
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and tame the problem of overinterpretation of law.  Next, I offer a short 
meditation on Fredrich Nietzsche’s exhortation to “live dangerously,” as 
discerned by the radical legal theorist Adam Gearey, by seeking limitless 
interpretations about the law.
13
  Using the Nietzchean-Gearey approach 
as a foil, I delve into recent scholarship of literary theorist Umberto Eco 
about interpretation and overinterpretation that suggests the need for 
limits of interpretation.
14
 
II. THE RHETORICAL NATURE OF EXCESS 
A. A Very Brief Overview of Rhetoric 
“Rhetoric is a storehouse of communicative tactics: some are hoary 
and stale . . .; some are too new to be codified (like ‘emoticons’ in e-
mails); most are time-bound, dependent upon audience and occasion.”15  
Scholars of rhetoric acknowledge its “scarlet past” and its slippery 
definitions over the centuries:  “sophistry, queen of the liberal arts, oldest 
of the humanities . . . practical logic, loaded language, purple prose” and 
the like.
16
  In recent years some rhetoricians have called rhetoric 
“purposive communication”—what one writer has characterized as “a 
stunning neutrality.”17 
Two basic elements comprise “the rhetorical enterprise”:  (1) a 
capacious view of appropriate modes of proof
18
 and (2) the importance of 
the audience.
19
  In turn, the creative process of rhetoric comprises five 
basic characteristics:  (1) invention,
20
 (2) arrangement,
21
 (3) style,
22
 
(4) memory,
23
 and (5) delivery.
24
 
 
 13. ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND AESTHETICS 74-75 (2001).  See infra Part V.D. 
 14. See infra Part V.D. 
 15. Thomas O. Sloane, Preface to ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC ix (Thomas O. 
Sloane ed., 2001) [hereinafter RHETORIC].  For interesting articles on the rhetoric of 
President George W. Bush and arguments that Bush overinterpreted the “War on Terror” 
see Stephen J. Hartnett & Jennifer R. Mercieca, “A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve 
Nothing Great”; Or Four Theses on the Death of Presidential Rhetoric in an Age of 
Empire, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUDS. Q. 599 (2007); Robert L. Ivie & Oscar Giner, Hunting 
the Devil: Democracy’s Rhetorical Impulse to War, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUDS. Q. 588 
(2007). 
 16. Sloane, Preface to RHETORIC, supra note 15, at ix. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Sloane, Synoptic Outline to Contents of Rhetoric, supra note 15, at 800.  “In the 
rhetorical view, three kinds of evidence are considered relevant to establish a case: the 
perceived character of the speaker or writer (ethos), the argument or thought in the 
message itself (logos), and the emotions the audience is led to experience (pathos).”  Id.  
These terms probably originated with Aristotle.  Id. 
 19. Id.  Audiences are of two basic types:  mass audiences and virtual audiences.  Id. 
 20. Id. (“Invention includes the entire process of initial inquiry into uncertain 
questions, the reflection upon alternative possibilities of position, proofs and 
perspectives.”). 
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B. The Hermeneutical Limits of Ambiguity 
Hermeneutics involves the making and understanding of meaning 
through interpretation.
25
  Biblical hermeneutics—catalyzed by the Jewish 
mystic tradition of Kabbalah in the late twelfth century—began in 
earnest the human penchant for “translating, explaining, and asserting”26 
that had its cultural roots with the ancient Greeks.  The term 
“hermeneutics” goes back to Greek mythology and “the wing-footed 
messenger god, Hermes,” who had the difficult and delicate job of 
communicating the “words of the gods” in a way that “human 
intelligence [could] comprehend.”27  One scholar helped to clarify the 
nature of hermeneutics by observing that it involves “Hermes process” 
whereby “something foreign, strange, separated in time, space, or 
experience is made familiar, present, comprehensible; something 
requiring representation, explanation, or translation is somehow brought 
to understanding—is interpreted.”28 
Importantly the traditional discipline of hermeneutics is cabined by 
the concept of rhetorical competence.
29
  Rhetorical competence 
demands, on the one hand, the art of persuading others on the meaning of 
a text but, on the other hand, a “devot[ion] to cultivating judgment and 
practical wisdom in others.”30  Yet, rhetorical competence also involves, 
at its core, a moral pursuit
31
 of “the art of understanding,” dedicated to 
advancing a robust “scholarly enterprise” entailing the interpreter’s good 
faith interpretation that clearly discloses to the audience “any truth claim 
regarding the authorial intentions of a given text.”32 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  “Style is a central category of rhetoric, which at the same time possesses 
profound cultural significance.  As verbal expression, it is essential to rhetoric, but is also 
significantly related to other areas of cultural production such as literature, and it has 
deep socioaesthetic implications.”  Wolfgang G. Müller, Style, in RHETORIC, supra note 
15, at 745.  A dimension of style is “appropriateness (aptum).”  Id. at 746.  “This quality 
requires that the orator’s words must be appropriate to the subject of the speech, to the 
person of the speaker, the nature of the audience, and to time and place.”  Id.  “Propriety 
is a category which extends from rhetoric to literature and life and culture in general.”  Id. 
 23. Sloane, Synoptic Outline to Contents of Rhetoric, supra note 15, at 800. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Michael J. Hyde, Hermeneutics, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 329. 
 26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (quoting RICHARD PALMER, HERMENEUTICS 14 (1969)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 29. Michael J. Hyde, Hermeneutics, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 331. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 330.  Rhetoric, in Aristotle’s sense, means reasoning under uncertainty 
(compared to mathematical and logical reasoning).  Interpretation is one element of such 
reasoning and hermeneutics emphasizes the uncertainty of interpretation. 
 32. Id. at 331.  Thus: 
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Ambiguity is related to hermeneutics in that the process of 
interpretation may admit multiple plausible explanations.
33
  The fifth-
century, B.C.E., Greek Sophists magnified the potentialities of ambiguity.  
“They concluded that, since it is impossible for humans to know with 
certainty . . ., the best practicable alternative is to equip skilled rhetors to 
argue competently on all sides of a probable issue.”34  Thus, the Sophists 
believed in a powerfully indeterminate human world.
35
 
A twentieth century literary theorist, William Empson, articulated a 
modest Sophist manifesto with his well-respected book Seven Types of 
Ambiguity.
36
  Empson took an expansive view of ambiguity that could 
arise, in his view, with slight literary “nuance” leading to “alternative 
reactions to the same piece of language.”37  While Empson did not rule 
out the potential of shared meaning through literary interpretation, he, 
nevertheless, celebrated “the rich potential of symbolic ambiguity for 
literary contexts.”38  Yet, deconstructionists, exemplified by Jacques 
Derrida, attempted to take ambiguity in texts to the level of radical 
indeterminacy.  Indeed, Derrida “argued that experiential and symbolic 
ambiguities entail . . . texts innately negat[ing] themselves” and 
paradoxical meanings at every juncture.
39
 
But some later twentieth century literary theorists objected to the 
turn to overinterpretation.  For example, M.H. Abrams argued that 
Empson’s typology of multi-ambiguity in texts encouraged excessive 
hermeneutics:  “over-reading” involving “ingenious, overdrawn, and 
sometimes self-contradictory explications that violate the norms of the 
English language and ignore . . . context.”40  In a similar manner, other 
theorists took a pejorative view of modernist proponents of literary 
ambiguity.
41
 
 
In short, the rhetorical competence that informs a text leads hermeneutics in the 
direction it must go to reach out to and engage others so that its declared 
understanding of a particular subject matter can be shared, agreed with, or 
disputed.  This is how hermeutics achieves practical significance:  by returning, 
with the help of rhetoric, from the workings of the mind to the everyday world 
of situated, practical concerns. 
Id. 
 33. Kathryn M. Olson, Ambiguity, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 21. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY (3d. ed. 1953). 
 37. Id. at 1. 
 38. Kathryn M. Olson, Ambiguity, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 22. 
 39. See id. (citing JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1978)). 
 40. Id. (quoting M.H. ABRAMS, A GLOSSARY OF LITERARY TERMS 9 (3d ed. 1971)). 
 41. See, e.g., Tom Tashiro, Ambiguity as Aesthetic Principle, in 1 DICTIONARY OF 
THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: STUDIES OF SELECTED PIVOTAL IDEAS 48-60 (Phillip P. Weiner 
ed., 1968). 
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The hermeneutical limits of ambiguity—akin to the related concept 
of rhetorical competence
42—were staked out by Roger Hufford in an 
article that distinguished ethical and unethical rhetorics of ambiguity, 
wherein he insisted that a “prominent goal” of genuine ethical public-
spiritedness infuses rhetoric with a search for ethical ambiguity.
43
  Alas, 
Hufford’s ethical rhetorical ambiguity is, itself, ambiguous! 
C. The Theatricality of Law 
The historical and social functions of the theater, on the one hand, 
and of law, on the other hand, have at times competed and at other times 
complemented each other.  Theater and law both relied upon myth and 
both staged truth for an audience.
44
  Both used fictions and actors to 
advance a coherent narrative in a public realm.
45
  Legal rhetoric has, 
from ancient times to the present, sought to meld law and the theater into 
a study of social communication that focuses on the language of the law 
and law’s theatricality.46  Legal rhetoric’s “object is explicitly the study 
of verbal action, of the force and effect of law.  It is a study of legal 
performances, of the enactment of law through argumentative 
persuasion, and through the written justifications of statute, doctrine, and 
judgment.”47 
Since law is wrapped up in drama performed by actors (lawyers, 
witnesses, law enforcement officials, parties, judges, legislators, 
executive officers), it is inherent in the nature of law that some actors 
will overplay their roles and overact their lines.  Indeed, the humanistic 
turn in European legal academies within universities, which occurred 
during the fifteenth century, had as its purpose the dismantling of what 
was viewed as sophistic overinterpretation of law from corrupt legal 
rhetoric.
48
  So, too, twentieth century legal theorists—like Belgian jurist, 
Chaim Perelman
49—as well as a host of legal thinkers in recent and 
contemporary reform movements (legal realism, critical legal studies, 
critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence, and others) have been 
 
 42. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
 43. Kathryn M. Olson, Ambiguity, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 22, 24 (citing 
Roger Hufford, The Dimensions of an Idea: Ambiguity Defined, 14 TODAY’S SPEECH 4-8 
(1966)). 
 44. Peter Goodrich, Law, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 417. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.; see also SADAKAT KADRI, THE TRIAL: FOUR THOUSAND YEARS OF 
COURTROOM DRAMA 277-332 (2006) (discussing the criminal jury trial as “a theater of 
justice”). 
 48. Peter Goodrich, Law, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 419. 
 49. See generally CHIAM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, A NEW 
RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (1969). 
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concerned with past, purportedly unjust and overblown styles of legal 
interpretation.
50
  At various times, utilizing various methodologies of 
criticism, these legal theorists have problematized overwrought stagings 
of legal practice, and criticized overdone language as well as overzealous 
gender parlance.
51
  Those lawyers who have lost their bearings—fated to 
be characterized in various social epochs over the centuries in Europe 
and America as ranters, pettifoggers and declaimers—can be viewed as 
misapprehending the subtle relation between ethics and legality on one 
side of the scale of persuasive advocacy, and oratory and theater on the 
other side.
52
  (An interesting historical manifestation of this concern for 
oratorical balance occurred in ancient Rome, most notably with Cicero, 
in orators’ wariness of theater and theatricality and their emphasis to 
distinguish oratorical delivery from mere “acting on the stage.”)53 
D. The Problem of Hyperbole 
Exaggeration and overstatement that exceed the reality and truth of 
a particular issue is known as hyperbole and is generally (but not always) 
viewed as an undesirable and unattractive rhetorical trope figure of 
speech.
54
 
One prominent type of hyperbole in literature is the “loud liar”—”a 
soldierly braggart of Roman and Renaissance comedy, of whom a 
prominent representative is Shakespeare’s Falstaff.”55  Another important 
category of hyperbole is a literary character who is an “overreacher” 
illustrated by Christopher Marlowe’s Renaissance hero Tamburlaine who 
is portrayed by the poet as delivering the following hyperbolic oration:  
“I hold the Fates bound fast in iron chains,/And with my hand turn 
Fortune’s wheel about.”56 
Excessive hyperbole (as opposed to artful hyperbole) can draw the 
critique of “rhetorical bombast,” so powerfully expressed in 
Shakespeare’s Love Labour’s Lost:  “Three-pil’d hyperboles, spruce 
affection,/Figures pendanticall.”57  In modern times advertising claims 
and slogans utilize lots of hyperbolic language.  Other examples of 
everyday hyperbole include “a numerical overstatement, a comparative, a 
 
 50. Peter Goodrich, Law, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 419. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 422. 
 53. Kathleen E. Welch, Delivery, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 219. 
 54. Heinrich F. Plett, Hyperbole, in RHETORIC, supra note 15, at 364. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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superlative, an upgrading adjective, or an exaggerating constituent of a 
nominal compound (‘mega-city’).”58 
III. THE SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF ROLES IN TEAM 
PERFORMANCES 
A. Roles, Social Interaction, and Dramaturgy 
The concept of role is fundamental in sociological theory.
59
  Role 
involves the social expectations regarding social positions or statuses.
60
 
Role theory involves two different approaches.  The first approach 
is a social anthropological account of roles within a social system that 
consists of “clusters of normative rights and obligations.”61  Moreover, 
role players in a society have different partners and each partner has 
differing expectations.
62
  When we add up the total sum of expectations 
concerning a social role we have a role-set.
63
  In the frequent situations 
where expectations of role partners disagree, the result is “role conflict 
and role strain.”64 
The second approach to role theory is known as the social-
psychological school.
65
  This approach “focuses upon the active 
processes involved in making, taking and playing at roles”66 and draws 
upon symbolic interactionism
67
 and dramaturgy (looking at social life as 
consisting of drama and theatre).
68
 
Erving Goffman was an influential sociologist who pioneered the 
dramaturgical perspective of sociology in the 1960s and 1970s.
69
  In his 
book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,
70
 he set forth his 
sociological dramaturgical framework with a special emphasis on how 
 
 58. Id.  To round out the discussion of excess, exploring the twenty-first century 
dilemma that “[s]urrounded by excess, we [Americans] seem to have forgotten how to 
exercise self-control,” see Meghan Clyne, Saying Yes to Saying No, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 
2011, at A13 (reviewing the book, DANIEL AKST, WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY (2011)). 
 59. A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 570 (2d ed., 1998) [hereinafter SOCIOLOGY]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 570. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  Symbolic interactionism “focuses upon the ways in which meanings emerge 
through interaction.  Its prime concern has been to analyze the meanings of everyday life, 
via close observational work and intimate familiarity, and from these to develop an 
understanding of the underlying forms of human interaction.”  Id at 657. 
 68. Id. at 570.  Dramaturgy studies, at the micro-level, the interactions between 
people involved in role sets with a focus on “impression management.”  Id. at 171. 
 69. Id. at 260-61. 
 70. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). 
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people play roles and manipulate “the impressions they present to each 
other in different settings.”71  Goffman’s discussion of “discrepant 
roles”72 sheds light on our exploration of overinterpretation.  He claims: 
“One over-all objective of any team is to sustain the definition of the 
situation that its performance fosters.  This will involve the over-
communication of some facts and the under-communication of others.”73  
Thus, as part of a team trying to sustain an interpretational situation, 
Goffman’s social performers must learn and practice the art of 
“impression management.”74  When “disruptions occur” in the 
performance, team members can “utilize techniques for saving the show” 
including ways to correct disruptions.
75
  Over-communication of some 
facts to the audience (such as the purpose of the dramatic situation, the 
traditions that led up to the dramatic situation and the problems that the 
team must overcome to achieve the dramatic denouement) might be a 
strategic way to both prevent disruptions and to defuse them should they 
occur in the course of performance.  Similarly, under-communication of 
other facts (such as the detailed histories of the characters, and 
precedents for the type of dramatic situation being staged before the 
audience) could have parallel strategic resonance. 
B. The Search for Dramaturgical Balance 
Teams in the law are theoretically diverse.  Some examples include: 
a client and his or her lawyers in litigational or transactional settings; a 
corporation’s inside counsel and its outside counsel; a trial court judge 
and his or her law clerks; judges who coalesce in supporting a majority, 
concurring, or dissenting opinion in a case; legislators who support or 
oppose a particular measure (along with their staff); the chief executive 
of a nation, state, or political subdivision (along with his or her staff); 
and government administrative agency officials and their staff.  As part 
of their performative roles in the law, these actors must advance and 
defend an interpretational situation of the law in the course of 
performances to achieve litigation victories, transactional successes, 
preferred legal outcomes, legislative wins, and regulatory objectives. 
In the course of these various roles and legal performances, legal 
actors must strategically decide upon an intepretational approach for 
each material issue in the conflict situation.  Given the generally 
conservative nature of legal discourse—with arguments tethered by 
 
 71. SOCIOLOGY, supra note 59, at 260. 
 72. GOFFMAN, supra note 70, at 141-66. 
 73. Id. at 141. 
 74. Id. at 208. 
 75. Id. at 239. 
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necessity to texts, precedents, intents, traditions, and public policies
76—
common sense and pragmatic interpretational approaches are likely to 
have the highest probability of success in advancing and defending a 
team’s legal situation.77  However, on occasion, more elaborate and 
complex legal interpretations may be needed in order to prevail, but 
complex interpretations risk rejection by legal audiences as over-
interpretations. 
On a basic level, attempts by legal actors to interpret 
straightforward, everyday, or simple legal contexts might raise the 
hackles of a legal audience who believes, like the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, that these matters do not require interpretation.
78
  So, too, 
an audacious, ambitious and perfectionist interpretational theory, such as 
Ronald Dworkin’s “constructive interpretation” that, as literary/artistic 
interpretation seeks to make the law—like an object—”the best it can be 
within its genre,”79 risks opposition by more mundane legal actors akin 
to Richard A. Posner who insist that legal interpretation is limited by 
such values as “the need for finality, the need for a single correct answer, 
and the deference to the intentions of the authors/lawmakers.”80  Finally, 
as explained by American literary critic Stanley Fish, the “interpretive 
community”—the immediate and foreseeable legal audiences who are 
likely to judge the interpretation
81—may disagree with an outlier 
interpretational performance and consider it to be over-the-top. 
IV. LAW AND OVERINTERPRETATION 
A. Journalistic and Non-Legal References to Overinterpretation 
During the last twenty-five years, journalists and non-legal analysts 
have, with increasing frequency, utilized the trope of overinterpretation.  
Some brief illustrations of this parlance are instructive. 
 
 76. See WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 13 (2002). 
 77. “While the theorists who share the label ‘pragmatist’ differ significantly in the 
details of their views, they generally preferred that the grand concepts of philosophy—
such as ‘truth’ and ‘justification’—be thought of instead in the more mundane terms of 
‘what works.’”  BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 163 (2004).  “The 
pragmatists opposed ‘foundationalism’ in philosophy and absolutism generally.  In 
analyzing terms and concepts, the pragmatists tended to focus on how they were used in 
life.”  Id. 
 78. The majority of legal actors probably agree with Ludwig Wittgenstein in limiting 
“the term and practice” of “interpretation” “to difficult texts or to certain important 
contexts.”  Id. at 103. 
 79. Id. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 104-05. 
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Using a WESTLAW “ALL NEWS” database on June 25, 2009, and 
the search “overinterp!”82  I found 189 citations going back to January 1, 
2008.  Most of the citations were medical news publications.
83
  Twelve 
subject matter categories encompass the overinterpretation parlance in 
this sample:  (1) politics,
84
 (2) medical news,
85
 (3) science,
86
 
 
 82. I uncovered 1,935 citations with the earliest citation consisting of a 1970 New 
York Times Abstract reporting that the New York Federal Reserve Senior Vice President 
warned First National City Bank “not to overinterpret [weekly] or monthly changes in the 
money supply.”  Abstract, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1970, at 35. 
My study and commentary on overinterpretation as a cultural phenomenon in Part 
IV is inspired by Herbert Gans.  HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE 
UNDERCLASS AND ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1995) (discussing the concept of the underclass 
in the media, politics, and society).  These non-legal examples of insights about 
overinterpretation may be useful in understanding the limits of legal interpretation—
“about demonstrations that certain proposed imaginable approaches [of interpretation] 
can be ruled out as untenable.”  KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS 4 (2010). 
 83. Ninety-nine of the 189 citations were articles that addressed medical news.  The 
ALLNEWS database includes transcripts of video news programs. 
 84. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Dave Steps In It, WASH. POST (June 11, 2009, 
7:45 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009 
061101132_5.html (“[T]he press has a tendency to overinterpret local elections. . . .”); 
Fareed Zakaria, The Secret of His Success: What Obama Has Been Able to Accomplish in 
His First 100 Days is Enough to Make any President Envious, NEWSWEEK, May 4, 2009, 
at 28 (“Just as important, Obama has not overinterpreted the moment.”); Carol Eisenberg, 
Terrorism is Still a Key Issue in Race, NEWSDAY, Feb. 4, 2008 (“But it would be a 
mistake to overinterpret [American’s reaction to another terrorist attack.]”). 
 85. See e.g., Nicholas Bakalar, Broccoli Sprouts May be Germ Fighters, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2009, at D6 (“‘We’re enthusiastic about the results, but we have to be careful not 
to overinterpret it,’ Dr. Fahey said.”); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Officials Note Youth of 
Serious Flu Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A14 (“[A doctor] cautioned against 
‘overinterpretation’ from such a small number of hospitalizations.”); New Clinical Trial 
Research Data Have Been Reported by A. Wringe and Co-Authors Clinical Trial 
Research, DRUG WK., May 8, 2009, at 509 (“‘Although reporting quality is unlikely to 
affect comparisons . . . care should be taken not to overinterpret small changes. . . .’”); 
Study Data from E.M.L. Chung and Colleagues Update Understanding of Stroke 
Research, BLOOD WKLY., Mar. 12, 2009, at 342 (“The researchers concluded: ‘Clinicians 
should be careful to avoid causal overinterpretation of transcranial Doppler ultrasound 
data.’”). 
 86. See, e.g., Kenneth Chang, In Lake, Signs of Slow Shift from Savannah to Sahara, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2008, at A11 (“Dr. Kropelin did not dispute the ocean core data but 
said it had been ‘overinterpreted.’”); Anand Gnanadesikan & Whit G. Anderson, Ocean 
Water Clarity and the Ocean General Circulation in a Coupled Climate Model, 39 J. 
PHYSICAL OCEANOGRAPHY 314 (2009) (“What is surprising, and should make us cautious 
about overinterpreting these results, is that the effect is so large when heat is added. . . .”); 
Paul Markowski, Erik Rasmussen, Jerry Straka, Robert Davies-Jones, Yvette Richardson 
& Robert J. Trapp, Vortex Lines Within Low-Level Mesocyclones Obtained from Pseudo-
Dual-Doppler Radar Observations, 136 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 3513 (2008) (“The 
differences in the exact number of vortex lines that form arches should not be 
overinterpreted. . . .”); Carolyn Y. Johnson, For Hints on Humans, Scientists Study Dogs’ 
Thinking, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2009, at 1 (“‘Everyone has their views about how smart 
they are.  No doubt we are overinterpreting—and in some cases underinterpreting,’ said 
Marc Hauser, a Harvard professor. . . .”); Mark Henderson, Probability Lessons May 
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(4) performing arts,
87
 (5) religion,
88
 (6) fine arts,
89
 (7) foreign policy,
90
 
(8) history,
91
 (9) race relations,
92
 (10) business and finance,
93
 
(11) education policy,
94
 and (12) literary studies.
95
 
 
Teach Children How to Weigh Life’s Odds and Be Winners—Professor Wants 'Risk 
Literacy' on the Curriculum, THE TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 5, 2009, at 16-17 (“‘We seem to 
grossly overinterpret immediate stories that happen to individuals around you, and from 
an evolutionary point of view that might be  enormously valuable. . . .’”). 
 87. See e.g., Fred Baumann, Amadeus on Stage; What Mozart’s Operas Tell Us 
About Mozart, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 9, 2009, at 44 (“Her treatment of The Magic 
Flute, with its much-decried, interpreted, and overinterpreted libretto, is appropriately 
sensible.”); Bernard Lane, Dark Side of Spain Revealed Along the Road to Redemption, 
THE AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 8, 2009, at 14 (“Predictably, the film has polarised opinion in 
Spain.  Precisely because Camino is rich in meaning, it’s easy to overinterpret.”); Howard 
Singerman, One and All One, ARTFORUM, July 1, 2008, at 111 (“[The opera] should 
probably not be overinterpreted.”). 
 88. See, e.g., William Rees-Mogg, The Pope’s Message is Not the Problem: The 
Image of an Ultra-Conservative Pontiff is False, THE TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 23, 2009, at 24 
(“[T]he withdrawal of the excommunication of a cranky pseudo-bishop who happens to 
have denied the Holocaust, [has] been overinterpreted in the press.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Kenneth Baker, Impressionist Women of Substance, S.F. CHRON., June 
15, 2008, at N20 (“Linda Nochlin, the doyenne of feminist art historians, has learned how 
to walk the line between fresh perspective and overinterpretation.”); Robert Pincus-
Witten, Pablo Picasso, ARTFORUM, Jan. 1, 2009, at 206 (“The sitter, depicted in what is 
widely overinterpreted as a masturbatory reverie, enjoys a prominent place in Picasso’s 
long succession of muses.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Andrew S. Erickson, Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A 
Window Into Chinese Thinking, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Oct. 1, 2008, at 35 (“While these 
informed commentaries are not definitive and should not be overinterpreted, they may be 
suggestive of the Chinese government’s viewpoint and future policy responses.”); Gary 
Sick, The Republic and the Rahbar, NAT’L INT., Jan. 1, 2009, at 10 (“[W]hatever we do 
(and that can include doing nothing at all) will be noted, registered and interpreted—
probably overinterpreted—in Tehran.”); Gordon Lubold, After Georgia, What Future for 
NATO?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 18, 2008, at 10 (“Meanwhile, in the reaction that 
followed last week’s events, some believe the world could be overinterpreting whatever 
strategic ambitions the Russians may or may not have beyond Georgia.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Claudia Anderson, Friendly Persuasion, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 8, 
2008, at 27 (“He sometimes seems bent on catching Lincoln in contradictions and lapses, 
as when he overinterprets the absence of any record of Lincoln’s mentioning former 
president and antislavery crusader John Quincy Adams. . . .”). 
 92. See, e.g., Rex W. Huppke, Perception Problem: When Outsiders Look in on 
Black America, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 2008, at 1 (“Jackson worries when the media view the 
Obamas through a racial lens and naively overinterpret or mischaracterize certain 
comments or actions.”); Thomas Friedman’s Civil War, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 17, 
2008, at 3 (“The press has a long and condescending history of overexcitement about 
(and overinterpretation of) racial ‘firsts’ in our country—so much, indeed, that the 
meaning of these particular distinctions is lost.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & Floyd Norris, Shares Rally as Oil Continues to Fall, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at C1 (“I would be cautious about overinterpreting any of the 
up days or down days this week.”); Jerry W. Jackson, New Truth of Our Economy: 
Numbers Lie, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 7, 2008, at C1 (“And even if Orlando’s rate was 
higher than that of any other metro area, it could easily be overinterpreted as a sign of 
real-estate weakness.”). 
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B. Law Review Literature and Other Legal Texts 
Legal commentators—like non-legal writers96—started deploying 
the language of overinterpretation in the last quarter of the twentieth-
century; the frequency of usage has increased steadily during the past 
four decades. 
Using WESTLAW “TP-ALL” database on June 25, 2009, and the 
search “overinterp!”  I found 140 citations of legal texts and periodicals 
going back to 1983.  The following discussion highlights and 
summarizes some of the uses of the overinterpretation trope in the legal 
literature.  The most prevalent context for legal commentators’ reference 
to overinterpretation involved cautions to avoid drawing factual 
conclusions from various kinds of empirical studies—overgeneralizing 
from data.  For example, one article urged circumspection in reviewing 
federal appellate judges’ votes on court panels tied to political party 
affiliation.
97
  Another usage involved heedful advice with regard to 
drawing conclusions from survey data about the impact of the custodial 
divorcing parent relocating to a geographical destination far away from 
the non-custodial parent.
98
  A further reference addressed the limits of 
false positives in brain-imaging tests.
99
 Several other legal articles apply 
a warning of overinterpretation vigilance in discerning the meaning of 
empirical data or studies applied to legal problems.
100
  Other 
 
 94. See, e.g., Corinna Crane & Sarah Theule Lubienski, What Do We Know About 
School Effectiveness?  Academic Gains in Public and Private Schools, PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN, May 1, 2008, at 689 (“[A]lthough recent work raises fascinating questions about 
an inherent superiority of private schools, there are good reasons to be cautious about 
overinterpreting this research.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Louis Lo, The Literary in Theory, MOD. LANGUAGE REV., Jan 1, 2008, 
at 176 (“Part II deals with literary concepts: texts, the sign, language’s performativity, 
‘overinterpretation,’ and ‘omniscience’”). 
 96. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text. 
 97. Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of 
Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1364 
(2009) (“However, one should be cautious about overinterpreting these results—for 
example, assuming that Republican male judges are less strategic than Democratic male 
judges. . . .”). 
 98. William G. Austin, Relocation, Research, and Forensic Evaluation, Part I: 
Effects of Residential Mobility of Children of Divorce, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 137, 138 (2008) 
(“[T]he reader is reminded of the danger of overinterpreting research findings and the 
limitations to the survey research method.”). 
 99. Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No-
Brainer” or a Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 483, 493 (2007) (“They also 
understand the hazards of overinterpretation and the risk of false positives.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 100. See, e.g., William L. Anderson, Barry M. Parsons & Drummond Rennie, 
Daubert’s Backwash: Litigation-Generated Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 619, 680 
(2001) (observing the potential use of expert research panels to “ensure that . . . reform 
research is not ‘overinterpreted’ to prove more than it actually supports”); Arthur Best, 
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overinterpretation parlance in recent legal literature involved matters of 
physical evidence;
101
 questions of judicial doctrine and precedent;
102
 
 
Student Evaluations of Law Teaching Work Well: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, 
Disagree, Strongly Disagree, 38 SW. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (suggesting an overinterpretation 
of quantitative data by erroneously “assuming that there are meaningful distinctions in 
small statistical differences”); Judith A. Chevalier & Fiona M. Scott Morton, State Casket 
Sales Restrictions: A Pointless Undertaking?, 51 J.L. & ECON. 1, 22 (2008) (urging 
caution in not overinterpreting empirical data to funeral chains in several states); James 
D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?  An Empirical Analysis of Lead 
Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1637 (2006) (reviewing 
data on “provable loss ratios,” pausing to remind others not to overinterpret the result, but 
claiming that the data has “enormous” “potential significance”); Nancy A. Denton, The 
Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and 
Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 1208 (2001) (warning not to overinterpret housing data); 
Marjory E. DeWard, Note, Psychological Evaluations: Their Use and Misuse in Illinois 
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 984 (2005) (warning against 
“overinterpreting clinical or assessment data”); Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: 
The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 300 (2002) (noting 
that federal court data “were overinterpreted as well as underanalyzed”); Angela K. Gore, 
Kevin Sachs & Charles Trzcinka, Financial Disclosure and Bond Insurance, 47 J.L. & 
ECON. 275, 296 (2004) (cautioning against overinterpreting economic findings); Joseph 
A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value 
of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 735 (2002) 
(cautioning against overinterpretation of regression analyses); Marshall B. Kapp, Legal 
Standards for the Medical Diagnosis and Treatment of Dementia, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 359, 
370 (2002) (noting that “[c]linicians should avoid overreliance on and overinterpretation 
of laboratory findings, particularly computed tomography and magnetic imaging results”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: 
Comments on “Inside the Administrative State,” 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1507 (2007) 
(criticizing an overinterpretation of data and an “unsympathetic, if not hostile” approach 
in another article); Jonathan Mantel, Janet Kester & Elliott Zenick, Power Plants, 
Particulates, and the Uncertain Science of Public Health, 18 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 31, 38 
(2004) (arguing that the epidemiological data regarding potential health effects of 
particulate matter has been overinterpreted and, therefore, has “tended to misinform 
public and judicial opinion”); Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the 
World (Leximetric II), 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 136 (2008) (noting that a divergence in 
empirical data should not be overinterpreted); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries?  A Review of Social 
Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1009 (2003) (claiming a need 
to not overinterpret results of studies regarding race and juries); David Weisburd & Alex 
R. Piquero, How Well Do Criminologists Explain Crime?  Statistical Modeling in 
Published Studies, 37 CRIME & JUST. 453, 478 (2008) (warning against overinterpretation 
of modeling data because “[m]acro- and micro-level theories are often investigated at 
different levels of analysis” and some “studies [are] conducted at higher levels of 
aggregation”); Davin Youngclarke, Kathleen Dyer Ramos & Lorraine Granger-Merkle, A 
Systematic Review of the Impact of Court Appointed Special Advocates, 5 J. CTR. FOR 
FAM., CHILD. & CTS. 109, 123 (2004) (warning against overinterpreting studies regarding 
special advocates for children). 
 101. ROBERTO ARON, JULIUS FAST & RICHARD B. KLEIN, TRIAL COMMUNICATIONS 
SKILLS § 22:29 (2d ed. 2008) (suggested line of questioning to confirm the importance of 
avoiding “overinterpretation of bloodstain patterns” to avoid misleading conclusion); 
Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform, 17 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R. L.J. 299, 340 (2007) (noting that “because of pressure to ‘solve’ a particularly 
horrendous crime, even the most well-intentioned and educated criminalists have 
  
2012] OVERINTERPRETING LAW 1097 
political meanings;
103
 social and literary theory;
104
 and behavioral/ 
psychological discourse.
105
 
 
succumbed to overinterpreting the results of a physical analysis”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 102. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Re-Membering Law in the Internationalizing 
World, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 102 (2005) (claiming the inappropriateness of 
overinterpreting European court decisions); John S. Kane, Refining Chevron—Restoring 
Judicial Review to Protect Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 541 (2008) 
(discussing how the Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine’s boundary has been 
overinterpreted); Nickolai G. Levin, Constitutional Statutory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L. REV. 
1281, 1306 (2003) (discussing possible overinterpretation by the New Deal Supreme 
Court of a constitutional moment); Nickolai G. Levin, The Nomos and Narrative of 
Matsushita, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1677 (2005) (arguing that lower courts have 
“potentially overinterpreted” the application of a U.S. Supreme Court anti-trust decision 
to parallel pricing cases “effectively requiring too much of plaintiffs at the summary 
judgment stage”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: 
Administrative Law From Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1670 
(2008) (suggesting that some legal historical interpretations of Supreme Court 
administrative law opinions have sometimes overinterpreted the evidence); Tim Wu, 
Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 640 (2007) (arguing against overinterpretation of 
a Supreme Court opinion on national security). 
 103. See, e.g., Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Framing Affirmative Action, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 123, 127 (2006) (arguing against a political overinterpretation of a Michigan anti-
affirmative action initiative); John O. McGunnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America:  The 
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 537 (2002) 
(discussing an “overinterpretation of the civil rights movement”); Carolyn Strange, The 
Undercurrents of Penal Culture: Punishment of the Body in Mid-Twentieth Century 
Canada, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 343, 345 (2001) (discussing political overinterpretation of 
European ideas). 
 104. See, e.g., Subha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:  Rethinking the Patent 
Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1317 (2004) (discussing 
and critiquing a judicial characterization of patent and copyright as a social contract 
bargain and arguing that this constitutes overinterpretation); Alfred S. Konefsy, The 
Accidental Legal Historian: Herman Melville and the History of American Law, 52 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2004) (observing that “Melville’s pages are the object of wild 
overinterpretation”); Pierre Legrand, Paradoxically, Derrida: For a Comparative Legal 
Studies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 640 (2005) (claiming to eschew an overinterpretation 
of a literary text, equating overinterpretation to “a disconnected reading”). 
 105. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love Got to do With It?”—“It’s Not Like 
They’re Your Friends for Christ’s Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer 
and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 294 (2003) (discussing “[f]riendliness” as “a social 
practice designed to make day-to-day interaction pleasant and efficient by removing the 
friction produced by overinterpretation of the other’s motives”); Robert J. Morris, Not 
Thinking Like a NonLawyer: Implications of “Recognization” for Legal Education, 53 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 267, 275 (2003) (discussing, among other “biases” that affect “retrospective 
or postmortem investigations of situations,” the problem of sampling bias involving 
“overinterpretation of too few relevant cases”); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: 
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 
417, 456 (2003) (surveying studies that “show that by trying to evaluate more 
information, individuals . . . often overinterpret information, focus too much on less 
relevant information” and ignore key information). 
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C. Caselaw 
Surprisingly, lagging behind the usage in non-legal sources
106
 and 
scholarly legal texts,
107
 very few courts (in either published or 
unpublished judicial opinions) have had recourse to overinterpretation 
language.  My research has found only sixteen cases—twelve cases 
decided after 2000, with the earliest case decided in 1965.
108
 
In Morey v. School Board of Independent School District No. 492, 
Austin Public Schools,
109
 the Supreme Court of Minnesota quoted from 
the trial testimony that dealt with an expert opining “for not 
overinterpreting test results,”110 in a case involving a teacher whose 
contract was terminated because of her ineffective teaching methods, 
insubordination, and disruptive conduct.
111
 
Thirty years transpired before two separate judicial opinions in 1995 
utilized overinterpretation parlance.  A federal district court judge in 
Alabama issued two separate opinions involving the same case, Sims v. 
Montgomery County Commission.
112
  Sims involved a class-action 
lawsuit brought by African-American and female employees against the 
Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department for employment 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender; both references to 
“overinterpreting” related to a warning to avoid making too much of 
“small score differences” because employees within a given band of test 
scores are equally qualified.
113
  A 1998 judicial opinion that mentioned 
the overinterpretation trope was a Massachusetts trial court opinion 
construing a transportation contract with a bus company and a local 
school board.
114
  The trial court refused to “rigidly apply[]” the language 
of a certain paragraph contained in the agreement and observed that the 
bus company was “overinterpreting” the language of the document.115 
The turning of the millennium came and went before two more 
judicial opinions deployed language of overinterpretation.  A federal 
district court judge in Illinois, in a 2002 opinion, mentioned the technical 
 
 106. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. 
 108. I utilized a Westlaw “all cases” database on June 25, 2009, with the search term 
“overinterpr!” 
 109. Morey v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 492, Austin Pub. Sch., 136 N.W.2d 
105, 106 (Minn. 1965). 
 110. Id. at 107 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111. Id. at 106. 
 112. Sims v. Montgomery Cnty Comm’n, 887 F. Supp. 1479 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Sims 
v. Montgomery Cnty Comm’n, 890 F. Supp. 1520 (M.D. Ala. 1995). 
 113. Sims, 887 F. Supp. at 1486; Sims, 890 F. Supp. at 1526. 
 114. N. Suburban Transp., Inc. v. City of Worburn Sch. Comm., No. 973711, 1998 
WL 1284165 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 15, 1998). 
 115. Id. at *3. 
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debate, implicated in the controversy, involving “overinterpreting the 
data” of RFU levels.116  A Texas intermediate appellate court refused to 
allow the overinterpretation of pleadings to provide a litigant an 
inappropriate statutory remedy.
117
 
A 2004 California intermediate appellate court opinion in a criminal 
case delved into the trial testimony of an expert who had explained that 
“people suffering from PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder], 
depression and dissociation” tend to “overinterpret” threats of others and 
over-react to the perceived threats.
118
  Another 2005 California 
intermediate appellate court opinion, People v. Preston, involved a 
similar psychological assessment of a criminal defendant who had, in the 
expert’s opinion, “overinterpreted events.”119 
In Laymon v. State, the Supreme Court of Kansas opined that the 
state trial court judge below had been wrong “in overinterpreting” the 
Supreme Court of Kansas’ decision to deny the appellant’s petition for 
review,
120
 because that discretionary denial was not a decision on the 
merits.  Courts accelerated reference to overinterpretation parlance in 
opinions issued during 2005 through the first half of 2009:  two opinions 
admonished litigants against attempting to overinterpret contractual 
language;
121
 three opinions addressed purported overinterpretation of 
medical evidence;
122
 and one opinion argued that the majority had 
overinterpreted a state evidence statute and “as a result, approves 
exclusion of relevant evidence” that the dissenter thought should have 
been admitted in a criminal prosecution.
123
 
 
 116. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Intercounty Nat’l. Title Ins. Co., No. 00-C-
5658, 2002 WL 377728, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2002). 
 117. Crownover v. Crownover, No. 03-02-00193-CV, 2002 WL 31769037, at *3 
(Tex. App. Dec. 12, 2002). 
 118. People v. Thiecke, No. A098206, 2004 WL 1427023, at *4 (Cal. App. June 25, 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119. People v. Preston, No. A103369, 2005 WL 348962, at *3 (Cal. App. Feb. 14, 
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. Laymon v. State, 122 P.3d 326, 332 (Kan. 2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See also Penn v. State, 173 P.3d 1172, 1175 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 
overinterpretation language from the 2005 Laymon opinion). 
 121. Mason v. Orthodontic Ctr. of Colo., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1211 (D. Colo. 
2007); Happ v. Corning, Inc., No. Civ. A03-11258-GAO, 2005 WL 3704889, at *3 (D. 
Mass. Nov. 28, 2005). 
 122. Harrison v. Catholic Healthcare W. Grp. Long Term Disability Plan, 612 F. 
Supp. 2d 1099, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Babb v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 5:06-cv-281 
(Car), 2008 WL 4426059, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2008); Colon v. Sec’y of the Dep’t 
of Health & Human Serv., No. 04-044V, 2007 WL 268781, at *15 (Fed. Cl. 2007).  
 123. State v. Pennington, 132 P.3d 902, 912 (Kan. 2006) (Beier, J., dissenting). 
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V. MANAGING INTERPRETIVE ENERGY IN LAW 
A. Illustrative Categories of Potential Legal Overinterpretation 
When we think of potential categories of legal overinterpretation—
claims by advocates, judges, and litigants that an opposing reading of 
legal materials or evidence in a legal proceeding goes too far and is not 
justified by various norms of interpretation—what categories of disputes 
and theoretical undertakings come to mind and why?  What follows is a 
brief, illustrative, and tentative list of potential overinterpretation 
problems in law. 
1. Identity Epistemic Wisdom 
The confirmation process of Sonia Sotomayor raised an intriguing 
problem of legal interpretation: Can a Supreme Court Justice (or for that 
matter any judge who might be called upon to interpret law or evidence) 
exercise epistemic wisdom by virtue of her identity—as a woman, or a 
Hispanic?  This question arose in the immediate aftermath of President 
Obama’s nomination of Sotomayor, a United States Circuit Judge who 
made a comment in a 2001 speech when she stated that she “would hope 
that a wise Latina woman, with the richness of her experiences, would 
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who 
hasn’t lived that life.”124  In an ironic twist on Obama’s implicit 
agreement with Sotomayor’s “wise Latina woman” comment, Obama 
was criticized for disparaging the nomination of Justice Clarence 
Thomas because, in Obama’s words during the 2008 Presidential 
campaign, “I don’t think that he was a strong enough jurist or legal 
thinker at the time for that elevation” from federal appellate court judge 
to Supreme Court Justice.
125
  As pointed out by a Wall Street Journal 
editorial: 
[P]erhaps we can expect [Sotomayor] to join in opinions with the 
wise and richly experienced Clarence Thomas . . . who lost his father, 
and was raised by his mother in a rural Georgia town, in a shack 
without running water, until he was sent to his grandfather.  The same 
Justice Thomas who had to work every day after school, though he 
was not allowed to study at the Savannah Public Library because he 
 
 124. Naftali Bendavid, Sotomayor Makes Senate Rounds: High Court Nominee 
Addresses Concerns on Judicial Activism, Controversial Comment, WALL ST. J., June 3, 
2009, at A3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125. Kimberley A. Strassel, Editorial, The Sotomayor Rules, WALL ST. J., May 29, 
2009, at A13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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was black.  The same Justice Thomas who became the first in his 
family to go to college and receive a law degree from Yale.
126
 
Professor Lino A. Graglia of the University of Texas School of Law 
raised the interesting issues of whether the “racial and ethnic 
composition of the courts”127 is a legitimate matter in the American legal 
system and whether the tradition of impartial justice is compatible with 
identity epistemology on the bench when he opined:  “[t]he statue 
symbolizing justice is always a woman who is blindfolded to make clear 
that such individual characteristics as race and ethnicity are irrelevant.  
Judge Sotomayor’s conception of justice seems to be different.”128 
While experience is an acknowledged tool for thinking—by jurists 
and lawyers as well as non-legal laypersons—the uses of experience can 
be unreliable and misused.  Experience is “a crucial source of input” to 
our thought through “sense experience—what you see, taste, smell, feel 
and hear.”129  But what do we make of “those who claim to have 
religious experiences; . . . those who claim to have revelations; . . . those 
who claim to have extrasensory input, extrasensory perception?”130  The 
epistemic problems with self-revelatory experience—including gender, 
ethnic, and racial identity experience—is that these assertions of truth are 
difficult, if not impossible, to test.  While self-revelatory experiences can 
help jurists and lawyers to approach a particular legal problem (say, of 
discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, or race), and to assist a 
probing of the evidence and thinking about the meaning of relevant 
statutes, regulations, and precedents, there is a danger of making too 
much of one’s sensory experiences and empathy and taking the side of 
the litigant you, yourself identify with.  In other words, identity 
experience presents a risk of overinterpretation—of assuming improper 
motive by the non-identity litigant, of reading into broad legal language 
of discrimination your empathetic feelings about identity groups that 
share your background. 
Put in still different terms, personal experience can be flawed and 
“counterproductive if what has been cultivated and refined are bad 
habits.”131 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Lino A. Graglia, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2009, at A14. 
 128. Id. 
 129. James Hall, Tools of Thinking: Understanding the World Through Experience 
and Reason 22 (2005) (lecture transcript). 
 130. Id. 
 131. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF 
PERSUADING JUDGES (2008) (quoting T.W. Wakeling, The Oral Component of Appellate 
Work, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 584, 586 (1979)).  Cf. Warren Bennis & Noel Tichy, Editorial, 
Judgment Trumps Experience, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007, at A19 (“After a five-year 
study . . . covering virtually all sectors of American life, we came to the inescapable 
  
1102 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 116:4 
2. Law and Literature 
In recent decades, the interdisciplinary Law and Literature 
movement and its proponents have made ambitious claims about the 
edifying potential of literary texts to improve law and justice.  Among 
these bold theorists are Martha Nussbaum,
132
 Wayne Booth,
133
 Robin 
West,
134
 and James Boyd White.
135
 
Richard A. Posner, however, is concerned “that law and literaturists 
are claiming too much for their interdisciplinary venture” and engaging 
in “overstatement,”136 or, if you will, overinterpretation of the value of 
literature to legal improvement.  Writing in a revised and enlarged 
edition of his pathbreaking book, Law and Literature,
137
 Posner makes a 
number of points to deflate an overinterpretation of the potential for 
literature to edify legal studies.  He notes that “it doesn’t follow that 
because some people use literature as a source of insight into human 
nature and social interactions, other people, for example judges who are 
not already lovers of literature, should be encouraged to do so.”138  
Moreover, according to Posner, “[t]here is neither evidence nor reason to 
believe that literature provides a straighter path to knowledge about man 
and society than writings in other fields, such as history and science, and 
interactions with real people as distinct from fictional characters.”139  In a 
similar vein he observes:  “Rarely can readers extract from works of 
imaginative literature practical lessons for living.”140 
 
conclusion that judgment regularly trumps experience.  Our central finding is that 
judgment is the core, the nucleus of exemplary leadership.  With good judgment, little 
else matters.  Without it, nothing else matters.”). 
 132. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY 
AND LITERATURE (1990) (claiming that Greek tragedies and Anglo-American realist 
novels should be viewed as a part of moral philosophy); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC 
JUSTICE:  THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 12 (1995) (arguing that reading 
novels “develops moral capacities without which citizens will not succeed in making 
reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or political theory, however 
excellent”). 
 133. See, e.g., WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION 152 
(1988) (arguing that Shakespeare’s plays can reinforce and guide social norms). 
 134. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND LAW 368-89 (1993) 
(arguing that Shakespeare’s plays can reinforce and guide social norms and legal 
improvement). 
 135. See, e.g., James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn From Literature?, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (claiming that through literary education, lawyers and judges 
can be morally and professionally improved). 
 136. David Ray Papke, Problems With an Uninvited Guest: Richard A. Posner and 
The Law and Literature Moment, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1067, 1084 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD 
A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988)). 
 137. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (rev. & enlarged ed. 2002). 
 138. Id. at 315. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 316. 
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3. Constitutional Law 
A recent article by Professors Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson 
about the commonalities between international law and constitutional 
law
141
 raises, in interesting and unexpected ways, what can be reframed 
as the tendency of American constitutional law theorists to overinterpret 
constitutional law.  The authors achieve this result by describing how 
critics of international law have tended “to conclude that, in both form 
and function, international law is a qualitatively different and lesser 
species of law [than constitutional law]. . . .”142  The authors compare 
this American theoretical underappreciation—and overappreciation of 
American constitutional law—by pointing out: 
Constitutional law, in contrast, has been subject to few such doubts.  
Conceived as the overarching framework for, and thus inseparable 
from, the statutes, regulations, and common law rules that comprise 
the familiar domestic legal system, constitutional law sits securely 
opposite international law on the domestic side of the divide. . . .  In 
contrast to the dubious efficacy of international law, constitutional 
law is generally assumed to serve as an important . . . check on the 
interests of the powerful.
143
 
In the course of their analysis, however, Goldsmith and Levinson 
question the claimed conceptual preeminence of constitutional law in 
relation to international law and conclude that the two kinds of law are 
“architectural[ly] similar[] and interchangeabl[e]”144 and should, 
therefore, be viewed as really “two sides of the same coin:  addressing 
the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ manifestations of the sovereign state.”145 
Constitutional law, indeed, has drawn other overinterpretations.  By 
way of further illustration of this phenomenon, Professors Daniel A. 
Farber and Suzanna Sherry in their book, Desperately Seeking Certainty: 
The Misguided Quest for Constitutional Foundations,
146
 make an 
extended argument against grand theories of constitutional interpretation 
and, in the process, demonstrate that quests for overarching theories of 
reading and applying the U.S. Constitution entail questionable 
overinterpretation.  Farber and Sherry summarize their critique against 
 
 141. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009). 
 142. Id. at 1793. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1864-65. 
 145. Id. at 1868. 
 146. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
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constitutional overinterpretation through grand theories of meaning as 
follows: 
Apart from their overblown anxiety about democratic legitimacy, 
grand theorists also believe that the rule of law will suffer if judges 
lack sure theoretical guidance.  But this fear is no better grounded 
than the concerns about majoritarianism.  On the contrary, the 
alternative to grand theory—the common law method that builds 
principles up from individual cases rather than down from abstract 
theories—has served the rule of law reasonably well.  Grand theory 
would be no improvement.  In practice, grand theory would be 
unlikely to bring greater order to legal doctrine, and collective 
deliberation over constitutional issues would be disrupted by the 
cacophony of conflicting theories.
147
 
4. Two Vague Doctrines:  Implied Pre-emption and Negligence 
Per Se 
Two judicially-developed doctrines, that of (a) implied pre-emption 
of state laws by federal courts “based on perceived conflicts with broad 
federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of 
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal 
law,” as articulated by Justice Clarence Thomas in a recent concurring 
opinion
148
 and (b) the doctrine of negligence per se, whereby courts 
construe the intent of a legislative body—often based on vague or 
manufactured notions of “intent”—to provide particularized standards of 
conduct in tort of negligence cases,
149
 are apt examples of doctrinal 
licenses for statutory overinterpretation by courts. 
Overinterpretation pursuant to the federal implied pre-emption 
doctrine springs from a number of abstract and non-concrete 
interpretational norms that have accreted over the years since the 
Supreme Court’s initial promulgation of the doctrine in 1941.150  These 
fudgy and noetic factors include the following: “broad atextual notions of 
 
 147. Id. at 141. 
 148. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 149. See Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble With Negligence Per Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 
221 (2009). 
 150. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding for the first time that 
federal law pre-empts state law when “under the circumstances of [a] particular case, 
[state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress”); cf. the Court’s other category of conflict pre-emption 
doctrine, the impossibility doctrine first articulated in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (determining pre-emption exists “where 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one 
engaged in interstate commerce”). 
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congressional purpose”;151 “congressional inaction”;152 “freeranging 
speculation about what the [objects] of the federal law must have 
been”;153 “[t]he nature of the power exerted by Congress”;154 “the 
character of the obligations imposed by the [federal] law”;155 “public 
sentiment”;156 “comments” made by federal administrative agencies in 
promulgating federal rules;
157
 “statements that the Government” makes 
in appellate briefs to the Court;
158
 and the “regulatory history” of a type 
of federal regulation.
159
  The overarching problem with the Supreme 
Court’s “purposes and objectives pre-emption jurisprudence” is that “it 
encourages an overly expansive reading of statutory text.”160  This 
“overly expansive reading,” as explained by Justice Thomas, leads to an 
unbalanced and distorted judicial assessment of the underlying 
compromises of the legislative bargain that led to the congressional 
enactment:  “The Court’s desire to divine the broader purposes of the 
statute before it inevitably leads it to assume that Congress wanted to 
pursue those policies ‘at all costs’—even when the text reflects a 
different balance.”161 
Overinterpretation under the negligence per se doctrine stems from 
similar unpractical and ideational doctrinal norms as the Supreme 
Court’s purposes and objectives pre-emption approach.162  First, 
negligence per se involves nonprescriptive statute-like enactments (state 
and federal legislative enactments, state and federal administrative 
regulations, and local governmental ordinances and codes) that are not 
expressly applicable to civil tort actions for money damages.
163
  Rather, 
nonprescriptive enactments assign quasi-criminal or administrative 
penalties for violations of the statute-like enactments.  Since the text of 
 
 151. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 594 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 595. 
 154. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 155. Id. at 595-96 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 596 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 157. Id. at 598. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 601 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas went on to 
opine: “As this Court has repeatedly noted, it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative 
intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must 
be the law.”  Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In the course of 
his concurrence in Wyeth, Justice Thomas cited and relied upon two important law review 
articles: John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70 (2006); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). 
 162. See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text. 
 163. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 311-14 (2000) (discussing classes of 
prescriptive statutes in tort). 
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these enactments is devoid of any express applicability to civil tort 
actions, it is problematic to read the nonprescriptive enactments as 
governing tort law.  Second, since legislative histories and regulatory 
history materials are typically sparse or non-existent at the state level—
the overwhelming corpus of enactments inspiring negligence per se 
arguments—courts must seek to divine legislative “intent” from often 
metaphysical analyses.  The negligence per se touchstone (whether the 
nonprescriptive enactment was designed to protect a particular class of 
persons from a particular kind of harm) is extremely malleable by 
creative rhetorical arguments.
164
  Third, the wide-ranging and expansive 
set of excuses for an alleged tortfeasor’s violation of a nonprescriptive 
standard opens the door to further chicanery and equivocation.
165
  In a 
previous article,
166
 relying upon the legal theory of a properly 
functioning legal system,
167
 I identified numerous general form and 
function problems
168
 and specific form and function problems
169
 with the 
negligence per se doctrine.  In a nutshell, these theoretical difficulties can 
be boiled down to unwise incentives of the negligence per se doctrine 
that encourage an overly expansive reading and misapplication of 
statutory text. 
B. Other Potential Categories of Legal Overinterpretation 
Other areas of law are subject to persuasive claims of 
overinterpretation.  Some examples of potentially overinterpreted legal 
theories include the following: law and economics,
170
 behavioral law and 
economics,
171
 and critical legal studies (and other critical approaches 
 
 164. Blomquist, supra note 149, at 222. 
 165. Id. at 225. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A 
GENERAL STUDY (2006). 
 168. See supra note 149, at 272-85 (discussing how general form and function 
problems of negligence per se doctrine involve problems of fundamental origin, 
unreasonable haphazardness, nonflexibility, institutional legitimacy, and a dysfunctional 
enforcement or implementative problem). 
 169. See id. at 280 (stating that specific form and function problems of negligence per 
se doctrine involve problems of high manipulation, importation of criminal law standards 
without criminal law protections for defendants, uncabined excuses, self-defeating 
process, excessive judicial discretion, and judicial encroachment on the legislature).  
 170. Behavioral law and economics scholarship changes the view of law and 
economics that assumes rational actors who are self-interested, harbor stable and well-
ordered preferences, and act always in favor of wealth maximization.  See BRIAN H. BIX, 
A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 22 (2004). 
 171. Classical economists have argued that behavioral economists have overstated the 
alleged defects in the “rational man” model inherent in law and economics theory and 
“that markets can be rational even when individuals are not.”  Id. 
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such as feminist legal theory, postmodernist legal theory, and critical 
race theory).
172
 
Similarly, legal proof standards that emphasize “doubt”—such as 
the criminal burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
173
 and various 
regulatory standards requiring reasonable scientific certainty
174—can be 
overinterpreted to require absolute certainty and absolutely no doubt. 
C. Unpacking, Better Understanding, and Taming Overinterpretation 
of Law 
A theory of managing overinterpretation of law—both descriptive 
and normative in nature—can be aided by considering three bodies of 
analogical concepts:  (1) pragmatic approaches to statutory interpretation 
that “look to multiple goals for statutory interpretation and insist on 
considering multiple sources”;175 (2) pragmatic considerations in 
 
 172. Critical legal studies encompass a “radical critique of law” with arguably 
overstated assertions “that law [is] radically indeterminate, and that legal reasoning [is] 
just a cover for the clash of different interest groups or different ideologies” such that law 
is just politics.  Id. at 46.  Legal indeterminacy, in turn, as a key tenet of critical 
approaches to the law, is a claim that “legal questions do not have correct answers, or at 
least not unique correct answers.”  Id. at 97.  As explained by Brian H. Bix: 
Those who argue that the law is significantly indeterminate base that 
conclusion on a variety of grounds: on the general nature of rules, the nature of 
language (e.g. pervasive vagueness, or deconstruction); gaps or contradictions 
within the law; the availability of exceptions to legal rules; inconsistent rules 
and principles that overlap in particular cases; the indeterminacy of precedent; 
and the indeterminacy in applying general principles to particular cases. 
Id.  Yet, other critics have pointed out that some legal cases resist creative interpretational 
strategies and that law in action in real cases is often predictable.  Id. 
 173. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 219-22 (2009) (discussing criminal burden of proof 
standard). 
 174. See, e.g., DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S 
ASSAULT ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008) (arguing that “mercenary” 
scientists and industry lawyers have increasingly shaped and skewed the technical 
literature, manufactured and magnified scientific uncertainty, and influenced government 
policy to the advantage of polluters and the manufacturers of dangerous products).  But 
see the analytically distinct matter of overinterpretation of facts in legal cases: DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS:  A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 16-
21 (2008) (describing the dangers of “interpretive fact-finding” by the Supreme Court in 
constitutional cases when the Court’s factual premises are uncertain and not subject to 
empirical verification); David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 137-
41 (2010) (discussing the new Supreme Court standard for adjudicating motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, premised on “plausibility,” determined, in part, by 
“judicial experience and common sense” and critics’ fears that motion to dismiss practice 
will allow “a license to rely on broad new categories of extrinsic information”). 
 175. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 249 (2d. ed. 2006) [hereinafter 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION].  See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text. 
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reconciling free trade with environmental protection;
176
 and 
(3) philosophical ideas that seek to explain the interplay of the abstract 
and the concrete.
177
 
1. Pragmatic Theory of Statutory Interpretation 
Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth 
Garret offer a pragmatic approach to the task of statutory interpretation, 
which can also shed some light on the problem of overinterpretation in 
legal theory.  Starting with the seminal thinking of one of the founders of 
American pragmatism, Charles Peirce,
178
 Professors Eskridge, Frickey, 
and Garrett contend that pragmatic reasoning should seek not to resemble 
a chain (no stronger than its weakest link) but, instead, should be like a 
cable of interconnected fibers.
179
  In developing what they call a 
“[f]unnel of [a]bstraction”180 to the task of statutory interpretation, these 
authors explain the wisdom of playing concrete considerations off of 
abstract factors in the process of interpretation.  They argue that this 
approach makes sense because “human decisionmaking tends to be 
polycentric, spiral, and inductive, not unidimensional, linear, deductive” 
and because it “consider[s] several values, and the strength of each in the 
context at hand, before reaching a decision.”181  “The Frickey and 
Eskridge Funnel of Abstraction” for statutory interpretation is as follows: 
 
 
 176. See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.  
 177. See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text. 
 178. See, e.g., CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, PRAGMATISM AND METHOD OF RIGHT 
THINKING (Patricia Ann Turrisi ed., 1997) (containing Peirce’s manuscripts for lectures 
on pragmatism).  “The term ‘pragmatism’ was introduced into the discourse of 
philosophers by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878, to express . . . ideas about logic (good 
thinking) [and catalyzed by William James’ invitation to lecture at Harvard in 1903, 
suggesting the “pragmatism” title of his lectures] which he had developed since 1867.”  
John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 31 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002). 
 179. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 175, at 249. 
 180. Id. at 250.  See infra Figure 1. 
 181. Id. at 249. 
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THE FRICKEY AND ESKRIDGE FUNNEL OF ABSTRACTION
182
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
This pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation is explained by 
Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett as encompassing interactive consideration 
of relatively concrete arguments juxtaposed with relatively abstract 
arguments: 
Our “funnel” reflects both the multiplicity of considerations and the 
conventional hierarchy ranking them against one another.  For 
example, because statutory text is the most accessible and formally 
the most authoritative basis for knowing what statutes require, it is 
the weightiest evidence.  Note also how the most concrete 
considerations, like text, outweigh more abstract ones, like best 
answer.  This model also suggests the interactive process by which a 
practical interpreter will think about the various sources of statutory 
meaning: she will slide up and down the funnel, considering the 
strengths of various considerations, rethinking each in light of the 
others, and weighing them against one another using conventional 
criteria.
183
 
 
 182. Id. at 250, Figure 1. 
 183. Id. at 250. 
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2. Globoecopragmatism 
Inspired by the Frickey and Eskridge Funnel of Abstraction for 
statutory interpretation, I developed the Blomquist Funnel of Pragmatism 
on Global Trade and the Environment,
184
 in an article entitled 
Globoecopragmatism:  How to Think (and How Not to Think) About 
Trade and the Environment.
185
  The principal thesis of my article was 
“that globalization is not as bad for the environment as critics contend 
and, in many ways, is good for the environment in the long term.”186  
However, “there are pragmatic steps that the international community 
can take to more intelligently ameliorate trade-induced environmental 
degradation and to better balance free trade with ecological 
protection.”187  My funnel of globoecopragmatism consists of seventeen 
principles and modes of inquiry, with the most abstract considerations at 
or near the lip of the funnel (for example, appreciating the complexity 
and uncertainty of reconciling trade and environmental considerations in 
an era of globalization, constant improvement of legal processes 
involving trade and the environment, and use of a limited and nuanced 
precautionary principle for protecting the global environment from trade-
induced degradation) and the most concrete factors at or near the tip of 
the funnel (for example, improving national environmental enforcement 
capacity and attacking corruption, better use of cross-country 
environmental statistics, and acceleration of bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements (FTAs)).  I summarized my approach as follows: 
[I]n thinking about issues of global trade and the environment, the 
most pragmatic and fruitful way to proceed is through a polycentric 
consideration of both abstract and concrete principles.  By pondering 
something general and something specific on trade and the 
environment issues, we can learn to exercise better judgment—call it 
globoecopragmatism—that will reflect both general standards and 
factual specifics.  In this way, perhaps we can make further progress 
in simultaneously opening global markets and protecting the earth’s 
environments.
188
 
The globoecopragmatism model that I proposed is as follows: 
 
 184. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. 
 185. Robert F. Blomquist, Globoecopragmatism: How to Think (and How Not to 
Think) About Trade and the Environment, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 129 (2006). 
 186. Id. at 129. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 188 (footnote omitted). 
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THE BLOMQUIST FUNNEL OF PRAGMATISM ON GLOBAL TRADE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT
189
 
FIGURE 2 
 
3. The Philosophy of the Abstract and the Concrete 
Epistemological problems with the classification of conceptions—
how we think about things, state fundamental problems, and define 
issues—have been the subject of discourse on the nature of concrete and 
abstract ideas for millennia.  Aristotle pointed out that “[m]en will 
frequently fall into fallacies through not setting out the terms of the 
premis[e] well”;190 Aquinas, speaking of the mystery of God, sought to 
explain human confusion on the subject by observing that “[w]e can 
speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite 
 
 189. Id. at 176. 
 190. ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS (A.J. Jekinson trans.), in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD 39, 66 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
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things from which we derive our knowledge” so that “in speaking of 
God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us 
only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns 
to signify His simplicity”;191 Locke devoted an entire chapter of his book, 
Concerning Human Understanding, to Of Abstract and Concrete 
Terms.
192
  In more modern times both William James
193
 and Sigmund 
Freud
194
 have wrestled with the psychological dimensions of abstract 
versus concrete thinking.  Discussing the evolution of human reasoning, 
James noticed: 
The first words are probably always names of entire things and entire 
actions, of extensive coherent groups.  A new experience in the 
primitive man can only be talked about in terms of the old 
experiences that have received names.  It reminds him of certain ones 
from among them, but the points in which it agrees with them are 
neither named nor disassociated.  Pure similarity must work before 
the abstraction can work which is based upon it.  The first adjectives 
will therefore probably be total nouns embodying the striking 
character.  The primeval man will say not “the bread is hard,” but 
“the bread is stone”; not “the face is round,” but “the face is moon”; 
not “the fruit is sweet,” but “the fruit is sugar-cane.”  The first words 
are thus neither particular nor general, but vaguely concrete; just as 
we speak of an “oval” face, a “velvet” skin, or an “iron” will, without 
meaning to connote any other attributes of the adjective-noun than 
those in which it does resemble the noun it is used to qualify.  After a 
while certain of these adjectively-used nouns come only to signify the 
particular quality for whose sake they are oftenest used; the entire 
thing which they originally meant receives another name, and they 
become true abstract and general terms.
195
 
Philosophy has wrestled with the tension between the concrete—
entities like physical objects, persons, and events, and terms or names 
that denote such things—and the abstract—like qualities, numbers, states 
 
 191. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1293), in 19 GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD 1, 16 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed. 1952).  See also id. at 205-08 
(discussing “Concrete Essential Names” for God and “Abstract Essential Names” for 
God). 
 192. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1689), in 35 
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 85, 284-85 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). 
 193. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890), in 53 GREAT BOOKS OF 
THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 305-08 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (discussing 
“abstract” ideas). 
 194. SIGMUND FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PHYCHO-ANALYSIS (June 
Riviere trans.), in 54 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 449, 516 (Robert Maynard 
Hutchins ed., 1952) (discussing “dream work” translation of abstract thoughts into 
concrete images). 
 195. JAMES, supra note 193, at 689. 
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and relations.  To make matters more difficult, many philosophers 
contend that there is a hybrid conceptual category called collective names 
or concrete universals, “i.e. names of classes or collections of concrete 
things, distinct from the [purely] abstract.”196  Existential philosophy, a 
twentieth-century phenomenon theorized by Martin Heidegger, Jean-
Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers and others, was anticipated by nineteenth-
century thinkers like Fredrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, Edmund 
Husserl and W.F. Hegel.
197
  Existentialism is “a family of philosophies 
devoted to an interpretation of human existence in the world that stresses 
its concreteness and its problematic character.”198  Concreteness 
dominated mid-twentieth-century continental European philosophy and 
Existentialist strands of twentieth-century American philosophy.  
Arguably, however, this obsession with the concrete and disparagement 
of abstract formalism and metaphysical speculation has been unwise and 
unpragmatic. 
D. Living Prudently:  Rejecting the Abyss of Infinite Interpretation and 
Embracing Limits 
Adam Gearey—a lecturer in law at the University of London—buys 
into the grand ambitions of Friedrich Nietzsche to “will” radical creation 
into being
199
 and to then apply it to law.
200
  The following references give 
us a flavor of Gearey’s interpretive project: 
Supposing that it were possible to learn anything from Nietzsche, one 
might take the following lesson.  The law rests upon an unsure 
foundation.  Law embodies a form, a set of values that mandate a 
way of living.  What allows the law to be posited in the first place 
could also perhaps lead to its overcoming.  One would require 
sufficient desire to will the law anew.  Aesthetics is, at heart, this 
energy to mandate the form of a world, to create oneself.  Ultimately 
it is the courage to will an ethics, to take from the law its power to 
determine forms of community.
201
 
Picking up on Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra,202 Gearey 
asserts that “[a]s things are set to recur, to return . . . the cost of their 
 
 196. 3 ENCY. BRIT. 519 (15th ed. 1985). 
 197. 4 ENCY. BRIT. 63 (15th ed. 1985). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Gearey relies on four principal books by Nietzsche.  FRIEDERICH NIETZSCHE, 
DAYBREAK (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1982); HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN (R.J. Hollingdale 
trans., 1996); THE GAY SCIENCE (Thomas Common trans., 1974); and THUS SPAKE 
ZARATHUSTRA (Thomas Common trans., 1974). 
 200. GEAREY, supra note 13, at 51-76. 
 201. Id. at 51. 
 202. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 199. 
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return is their reinterpretation”203 and a “celebrat[ion] [of] interpretative 
ethical energy.”204  This leads Gearey to argue:  “The aesthetic 
provocation to legal theory [by Nietzsche] is thus to continue a will to 
power, to will a different way of thinking and feeling the law.  If there 
were a summary [of this approach] it would be: will the law.”205  Gearey 
boldly asserts that “[t]he legal text does not appear as a repository of 
immemorial truths, but as a site in which ideological disputes can be 
fought out; the text itself carries radically inconsistent ideas that can be 
creatively worked at to elaborate accounts of human association.”206  For 
lawyers and judges who accept the Nietzchean-Gearey canon of legal 
interpretation (whether it be of statutes, regulations, cases, or common 
law) there are really no limits other than the injunctive gestalt to “make it 
new.”207 
We, of course, can trace the Nietzchean-Gearey style of legal 
interpretation to the heady days of literary theory, a few decades ago, 
when Percy Shelley’s dictum that “[p]oets [and literary theorists?] are the 
unacknowledged legislators of the world”208 held sway.  But ever since 
Umberto Eco’s 1990 Tanner Lecture, the manic, unbridled ambitions of 
literary theory have been rightfully brought back to earth.  Legal theorists 
should remember this wisdom. 
Umberto Eco’s Tanner Lecture was entitled Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation.
209
  In his follow-up commentary on the lecture, Eco 
ridiculed the notion “that interpretation has no criteria.”210  Indeed, Eco 
reminds we legal theorists that “[t]o interpret a text means to explain why 
 
 203. GEAREY, supra note 13, at 75. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).  Gearey provides a more sweeping explanation of his 
legal interpretative manifesto by claiming: 
The injunction placed upon the critical legal interpreter is to find the spaces 
where doctrine stumbles, where legal principles can become shaped to fit social 
realities, rather than simply repeating a legal logic.  This call to arms stresses 
the inseparability of legal theory, legal practice and political vision.  It heralds 
the coming of the lawyer as existential hero whose activity transforms both her 
and her world. 
Id. at 122. 
 206. Id. at 123 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 207. Id. at 124 (“Legal aesthetics would accept that life in law is defined by principles 
and rules that determine and restrain interpretive activity and political possibility, but it 
would see this as the challenge to the joyous interpreter:  make it new.”). 
 208. Percy Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, in SHELLEY’s LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
CRITICISM 131 (Henry Frowde ed., 1909). 
 209. The lecture was expanded and included in an edited volume that included three 
essays by Umberto Eco and replies by the world-renowned literary theorists.  See 
UMBERTO ECO, INTERPRETATION AND OVERINTERPRETATION (Stefan Collini ed., 1992).  
Umberto Eco is Professor of Semantics at the University of Bologna. 
 210. Umberto Eco, Interpretation and History, in INTERPRETATION AND 
OVERINTERPRETATION, supra note 209, at 23. 
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these words can do various things (and not others) through the way they 
are interpreted.”211 
Eco thinks it important that interpreters eschew the “irrational”—
the “senseless, absurd, nonsensical, incoherent, delirious, farfetched, 
inconsequential, disconnected, illogic[al], exorbitant, extravagant, 
skimble-skamble,” the “unsinning, unlogisch, unvernünftig, sinnlos.”212  
To do this, Eco defends the interpretative virtue of “moderateness”—
”being within the modus” (derived from “ancient Greek and Latin 
civilizations”).213  In a fascinating linkage between interpretative theory 
and political theory, Eco informs us:  “The Latin obsession with spatial 
limits goes right back to the legend of the foundation of Rome: Romulus 
draws a boundary line and kills his brother for failing to respect it.  If 
boundaries are not recognized, then there can be no civitas.”214  This 
insight has enormous importance for understanding legal interpretation 
and overinterpretation. 
Professor Eco gets at the praxis of overinterpretation when he 
reminds us that for the Übermensch, 
Every time one thinks to have discovered a similarity, it will point to 
another similarity, in an endless progress.  In a universe dominated 
by the logic of similarity (and cosmic sympathy) the interpreter has 
the right and the duty to suspect that what one believed to be the 
meaning of a sign is in fact the sign for a further meaning.
215
 
Eco, then, starts to try to put limits on the Übermensch by a brilliant 
gambit wherein we can find a useful approach to defining 
overinterpretation by deploying “a sort of Popperian principle according 
to which if there are no rules that help to ascertain which interpretations 
are the ‘best’ ones, there is at least a rule for ascertaining which ones are 
‘bad!’”216  This approach is further refined by Eco into a sort of 
Posnerian Law and Economics principle, when put in the context of legal 
 
 211. Id. at 24.  Eco follows this statement by the following: 
But if Jack the Ripper told us that he did what he did on the grounds of his 
interpretation of the Gospel according to Saint Luke, I suspect that many 
reader-oriented critics would be inclined to think that he read Saint Luke in a 
pretty preposterous way. 
Id. 
 212. Id. at 26 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 213. Id. (citation omitted). 
 214. Id. at 27; cf. id. at 34 (“New Hermetic irrationalism oscillates between, on the 
one hand, mystics and alchemists, and on the other, poets and philosophers, from Goethe 
to Gérard de Nerval and Yeats, from Schelling to Franz von Baadar, from Heidegger to 
Jung.  And in many post-modern concepts of criticism, it is not difficult to recognize the 
idea of continuous slippage of meaning.”). 
 215. Umberto Eco, Overinterpreting Texts, in INTERPRETATION AND 
OVERINTERPRETATION, supra note 209, at 47. 
 216. Id. at 52. 
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interpretation.  Eco says that “every act of reading is a difficult 
transaction between the competence of the reader (the reader’s world 
knowledge) and the kind of competence that a given text postulates in 
order to be read in an economic way.”217 
While Umberto Eco provides a detailed and nuanced follow-up to 
his Tanner Lecture insights in his book, The Limits of Interpretation,
218
 I 
think that the meta-principle he develops in that book can be stated quite 
simply.  Textual interpretation and use vitally depend on context and 
concreteness.
219
  As Richard A. Posner said in one of his judicial 
opinions: “Context may disambiguate.”220  Indeed, there is considerable 
overlap with the Eco-Posnerian contextual concern of interpretation and 
the late philosopher Richard Rorty’s pragmatic account of interpretation 
that seeks “to forget the idea of discovering What the Text is Really 
Like, and instead to think of the various descriptions which we find it 
useful, for various purposes, to give.”221  I think that a pragmatic, 
contextual method of legal interpretation is what Professor Jónsson 
recently sketched out in a 2009 article published in Legal Theory.
222
  
Professor Jónsson’s thesis is that vagueness in law does not call “for a 
specific interpretation of the law—interpretation that changes the 
meaning of the law and makes it more precise,” but rather, “that 
vagueness in law calls only for an application of the law to the case at 
hand,” pragmatically and for the limited purpose of deciding a concrete 
case.
223
 
 
 217. Umberto Eco, Between Author and Text, in INTERPRETATION AND 
OVERINTERPRETATION, supra note 209, at 68 (emphasis added).  Cf. id. at 88 (“Between 
the mysterious history of a textual production and the uncontrollable drift of its future 
readings, the text qua text still represents a comfortable presence, the point to which we 
can stick.”). 
 218. UMBERTO ECO, THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION (1990). 
 219. See id. at 62. 
 220. McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1983), quoted in THE 
QUOTABLE JUDGE POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
163 (Robert F. Blomquist, ed., 2010). 
 221. Stefan Collini, Introduction: Interpretation Terminable and Interminable, in 
INTERPRETATION AND OVERINTERPRETATION, supra note 209, at 11.  Cf. Richard Rorty, 
The Pragmatist’s Progress, in INTERPRETATION AND OVERINTERPRETATION, supra note 
209, at 102 (“For us pragmatists, the notion that there is something a given text is really 
about, something which rigorous application of a method will reveal, is as bad as the 
Aristotelian idea that there is something which a substance really, intrinsically, is as 
opposed to what it only apparently or accidentally or relationally is.”). 
 222. Ólafur P. Jónsson, Vagueness, Interpretation, and the Law, 15 LEGAL THEORY 
193 (2009). 
 223. Id. at 193.  Jónsson contrasts his underinterpretation approach to that of well-
known legal theorist Ronald Dworkin.  Id. at 193 n.1 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 129 (1985)) (arguing that we should ask “which interpretation . . . 
provides the best political justification for the statute at the time it was passed”). 
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Legal theorists, therefore, who seek to avoid overinterpretation of 
law seem to favor judicial minimalism.  Professor Michael Gerhardt 
explains as follows: 
For some scholars, resolving cases or controversies cannot be 
separated from how the justices explain themelves.  Cass Sunstein’s 
theory of judicial minimalism suggests, for example, the Court 
should generally undertheorize, which means leaving some things 
undecided.  He proposes some decisions should be narrow (confined 
to their particular facts) and shallow (reasoned thinly), while others 
should be narrow and deep (more elaborately reasoned).  Minimalism 
has the principal virtue of reducing judicial interference as much as 
possible with democratic authorities’ own, independent constitutional 
judgments.
224
 
Deciding specific legal problems—with the combined insights of 
abstract learning and a focus on concrete particulars—is, then, a recipe 
that works; an approach that avoids the abyss of excessive interpretation 
and that embraces practical limits.
225
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Parlor games that dig deep for hidden meanings are fun:  Wizard of 
Oz enthusiasts, art critics, and other culture vultures have enjoyed the 
 
 224. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 150 (2008) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274-75 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“A 
Talmudic maxim instructs with respect to the Scripture: ‘Turn it over, and turn it over, for 
all is therein.’ . . .  Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, 
but the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not.  The Court today continues its 
quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution.  
Alas, the quest cannot succeed.”). 
 225. Cf. LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION:  HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (relaying a wide assortment of contextual and 
practical methodologies of constitutional interpretation that have been usefully employed 
by the Supreme Court and individual Justices in grappling with and deciding specific 
cases). 
Professor Andrei Marmor offers some analogous thoughts on interpreting law.  See 
ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE AGE OF PLURALISM 4 (2007) (“[W]e must focus on what 
[the rule of law] means, and then ask why it is a good thing. . . .  Not less importantly, 
however, we must also realize that legalism can be excessive.  Even if the rule of law is a 
good thing, too much of it may be bad.”); id. at 27 (“Surely, there is some level of 
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of its subjects.  But it is equally clear that from a functional perspective, the law can 
tolerate a considerable amount of incoherence.”).  Moreover, the insights of Matt Ridley 
on the behavior of government officials and the mistakes that government officials make 
are interesting.  See Matt Ridley, Studying the Biases of Bureaucrats, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
23–24, 2010, at C4 (the “illusions of competence” mistake involves how officials 
“systematically overestimate how much [they] understand about the causes and 
mechanisms of things [they] half understand”). 
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innocent pursuit of overinterpretation for decades.  But how should legal 
theorists view overinterpretation of law?  As inevitable and harmless?  
As subject to abuse?  As a mere byproduct of a search for meaning in the 
face of ambiguity? 
In getting to the root of these overarching questions I first looked at 
the rhetorical nature of excess by considering the nature of rhetoric, the 
hermeneutical limits of ambiguity, the theatricality of law, and the 
problem of hyperbole.  Then, in order to switch perspective, I focused on 
the sociological dimensions of roles in team performances that involve 
social interpretations by considering roles, social interaction, and 
dramaturgy as sociologists view matters and went on to describe the 
search for dramaturgical balance. 
Turning to law and overinterpretation, I examined, by way of 
comparison, journalistic and non-legal references to overinterpretation, 
moving on to look at law review literature and other legal texts, along 
with caselaw that have deployed the parlance of overinterpretation. 
Finally, I tried to wrap up my law and overinterpretation project by 
broadly and boldly considering how to manage interpretive energy in 
law.  In this capstone portion of the Article, I first looked at illustrative 
categories of potential legal overinterpretation (identity epistemic 
wisdom, law and literature, constitutional law and two vague legal 
doctrines—implied pre-emption and negligence per se).  Second, I 
briefly alluded to other potential categories of legal overinterpretation 
(law and economics, behavioral law and economics, and critical legal 
studies approaches to legal interpretation along with legal proof 
standards that may have a tendency to over-emphasize doubt).  Third, I 
turned to unpacking, better understanding, and taming overinterpretation 
by looking at three illustrative approaches to modest interpretation: a 
pragmatic theory of statutory interpretation, a theory for better 
reconciling difficult tradeoffs between international free trade and global 
environmental protection dubbed globoecopragmatism, and some 
philosophical insights on the differences of abstract and concrete 
reasoning. 
The culminating portion of the Article argued that good legal 
interpreters—like good literary interpreters—should live prudently by 
embracing limits to interpretation and trying to situate legal problems in 
a proper context. 
